Detail Private Information, Strategic Behavior, and Efficiency in Cournot Markets   Oleh:  Vives, Xavier Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 33 no. 3 (2002), page 361-376. Topik: PRIVATE; private information; behaviour; cournot markets Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel When analyzing a Cournot market with strictly convex costs dependent on a private information parameter, do we err more by ignoring market power or by ignoring the impact of incomplete information ? Is the welfare loss at the market outcome driven by private information or by market power? The answer to both questions is that in large enough markets, abstracting from market power provides a much better approximation than abstracting from private information. Let n index the size of the market and the (free entry) number of firms. Then the effect of market power (private information) is of the order of 1 / n (1 / vn) for prices and 1/ n(2) (1 / n) for per - capita deadweight loss. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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