Detail Hush Money   Oleh:  Reinganum, Jennifer F. ; Daughety, Andrew F. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 30 no. 4 (1999), page 661-678. Topik: MONEY; hush money Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We provide a simple incomplete - information model wherein an initially uninformed plaintiff makes a menu of settlement demands (one of which involves confidentiality) of the informed defendant. The defendant is informed about both his culpability in the harm suffered by the current plaintiff and the existence of other plaintiffs. The possibility that there are other plaintiffs the defendant might face improves the current plaintiff's bargaining position, as the likelihood of follow - on suits depends upon the visibility of the outcome of the case. For this reason, the defendant may be willing to be "hush money." Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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