Detail Excess Entry, Vertical Integration, and Welfare   Oleh:  Kuhn, Kai-Uwe ; Vives, Xavier Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 30 no. 4 (1999), page 575-603. Topik: welfare; excess entry; vertical integration; welfare Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry. We give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to Pareto - improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety, excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets, and the welfare effects of vertical integration: Excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to Pareto - improving vertical integration. We extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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