Detail A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations   Oleh:  Wilson, Bart J. ; Thomas, Charles J. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 33 no. 1 (2002), page 140-155. Topik: negotiations; auctions; multilateral negotiations Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We compare first - price auctions to an exchange process that we term "multilateral negotiations.'' In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers with privately known costs, and then plays the sellers off one another to obtain additional price concessions. Using the experimental method, we find that with four sellers, transaction prices are statistically indistinguishable in the two institutions, but with two sellers, prices are higher in multilateral negotiations than in first - price auctions. The institutions are equally efficient with two sellers, but multilateral negotiations are slightly more efficient with four sellers. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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