Detail Learning by Doing and Dynamic Regulation   Oleh:  Lewis, Tracy R. ; Yildirim, Huseyin Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 33 no. 1 (2002), page 22-36. Topik: REGULATION; learning by doing; dynamic regulation Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel From experience, regulated monopolists learn to employ cost - reducing innovations. We characterize the optimal regulation of an innovating monopolist with unknown costs. Regulatory policy is designed to minimize current costs of service while encouraging development of cost - saving innovations. We find that under optimal regulation : (i) innovation is encouraged by light- handed regulation allowing the monopolist to earn greater information rents while providing greater service, (ii) innovation occurs in the absence of long - term agreements when private information is recurring, and (iii) innovation is more rapid in a durable franchise, and the regulator prefers durable franchises for exploiting learning economies. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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