Detail Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory   Oleh:  Stefanadis, Christodoulos ; Jay, Pil Choi Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 1 (2001), page 52-71. Topik: investment; tying; investment; dynamic leverage theory Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel The idea that an incumbent supplier may tie two complementary products to fend off potential entrants is popular among practitioners yet is not fully understood in formal economic theory. We make sense of the argument by formally deriving a dynamic version of the old leverage doctrine. It is shown that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in all complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating. Tie - in sales may reduce consumer and total economic welfare. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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