Detail On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects   Oleh:  Yongmin, Chen Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 4 (2001), page 667-685. Topik: mergers; vertical mergers; competitive effects Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel It is well known that vertical integration can change the pricing incentive of an upstream producer. However, it has not been noticed that vertical integration may also change the pricing incentive of a downstream producer and the incentive of a competitor in choosing input suppliers. I develop an equilibrium theory of vertical merger that incorporates these additional strategic considerations. Under fairly general conditions, a vertical merger will result in both efficiency gains and a collusive effect. The competitive effects of a vertical merger depend on the cost of switching suppliers and the degree of downstream product differentiation. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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