Detail Information and The Market For Lemons   Oleh:  Levin, Jonathan Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 4 (2001), page 657-666. Topik: MARKETS; information; market for lemons Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This article revisits Akerlof's (1970) classic adverse - selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade ? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the "buyer's curse,'' thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes of these effects. A characterization is given. On the other hand, improving the buyer's information -i. e., making private information public - unambiguously improves trade so long as market demand is downward sloping. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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