Detail Competitive Price Discrimination   Oleh:  Armstrong, Mark ; Vickers, John Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 4 (2001), page 579-605. Topik: discrimination; competitive; price discrimination Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers. The equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship p(u) between profit and average utility per consumer. Public policy constraints on the "deals'' firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on TT(u). From this perspective we examine the profit, utility, and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework. We also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two - part tariffs. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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