Detail Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects   Oleh:  Laux, Christian Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 3 (2001), page 514-526. Topik: liability; liability; incentive contracting; multiple projects Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel I examine a principal - agent model with multiple projects where a risk - neutral manager is protected by limited liability. The analysis has several interesting implications : (i) Incentive problems are shown to be a natural source of economies of scope, as combining multiple projects under the management of a single manager relaxes the limited - liability constraint. (ii) As a result, managers may be overloaded with work and exert inefficiently high effort. (iii) The analysis has implications for the optimal allocation of projects to different managers. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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