Detail Optimal Collusion With Private Information   Oleh:  Bagwell, Kyle ; Athey, Susan Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 3 (2001), page 428-465. Topik: TACIT COLLUSION; optimal collusion; private information Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i. i. d. cost shock in each period. Productive efficiency is possible only if high-cost firms relinquish market share. In the most profitable collusive schemes, firms implement productive efficiency, and high - cost firms are favored with higher expected market share in future periods. If types are discrete, there exists a discount factor strictly less than one above which first - best profits can be attained using history - dependent reallocation of market share between equally efficient firms. We also analyze the role of communication and side - payments. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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