Detail Incentives Versus Transaction Costs : A Theory of Procurement Contracts   Oleh:  Tadelis, Steven ; Bajari, Patrick Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 3 (2001), page 387-407. Topik: procurement; incentives; transaction costs; procurement contracts Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Inspired by facts from the private - sector construction industry, we develop a model that explains many stylized facts of procurement contracts. The buyer in our model incurs a cost of providing a comprehensive design and is faced with a tradeoff between providing incentives and reducing ex post transaction costs due to costly renegotiation. We show that cost - plus contracts are preferred to fixed - price contracts when a project is more complex. We briefly discuss how fixed - price or cost - plus contracts might be preferred to other incentive contracts. Finally, our model provides some microfoundations for ideas from Transaction Cost Economics. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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