Bargaining, Interdependence, and The Rationality of Fair Division  

Oleh:

Lopomo, Giuseppe ; Ok, Efe A.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 2 (2001), page 263-283.
Topik: bargaining power; bargaining; interdependence; rationality; fair division

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We consider two - person bargaining games with interdependent preferences and bilateral incomplete information. We show that in both the ultimatum game and the two - stage alternating - offers game, our equilibrium predictions are consistent with a number of robust experimental regularities that falsify the standard game theoretic model : occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and outcomes that come close to the equal split of the pie. In the context of infinite - horizon bargaining, the implications of the model pertaining to fair outcomes is even stronger. In particular, the Coase property in our case generates "almost" 50 - 50 splits of the pie, almost immediately. The present approach thus provides a positive theory for the frequently encountered phenomenon of the 50 - 50 division of the gains from trade.

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