Detail Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets   Oleh:  Meza, David de ; Webb, David C. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 2 (2001), page 249-262. Topik: INSURANCE; advantageous selection; insurance markets Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision. Risk - tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer, more risk - averse types. Taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients, allowing a strict Pareto gain. This result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies, as does the novel finding of a pure - strategy, partial - pooling, subgame - perfect Nash equilibrium in the insurance market. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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