Detail Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes   Oleh:  Sjostrom, Tomas ; Baliga, Sandeep Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 32 no. 1 (2001), page 27-51. Topik: DESIGN; optimal design; peer; self - assessment schemes Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel A principal must decide whether or not to implement a project which originated with one of her employees. Several employees have information about the quality of the project. A successfully implemented project raises the inventor's chance of promotion, at his peer's expense, but a failed project ruins the inventor's career. An employee who has a relatively good reputation (and therefore is happy with the status quo) must be encouraged to promote new ideas. An employee who has a relatively bad reputation (and therefore wants to change the status quo) must be prevented from exaggerating the quality of new ideas. We study incentive - compatible and renegotiation - proof mechanisms, and find that self - assessment (without any peer reports) is optimal. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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