Detail Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition   Oleh:  Spagnolo, Giancarlo Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 31 no. 1 (2000), page 22-42. Topik: PRODUCT MARKET; stock - related; compensation; product - market competition Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel I show that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, profits are distributed as dividends, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock - related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies. The stock market anticipates the losses from punishment phases and discounts them on stock prices, reducing managers' short - run gains from any deviation. When deferred, stock - related incentives may remove all managers' short-run gains from deviation, making collusion supportable at any discount factor. The results hold with managerial contracts of any length. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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