Detail Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists   Oleh:  Padilla, A. Jorge ; Manove, Michael Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 30 no. 2 (1999), page 324-350. Topik: BANKING; banking; consevatively; optimists Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Commercial banks frequently encounter optimistic entrepreneurs whose perceptions are biased by wishful thinking. Bankers are left with a difficult screening problem : separating realistic entrepreneurs from optimists who may be clever, knowledgeable, and completely sincere. We build a game - theoretic model of the screening process. We show that although entrepreneurs may practice self - restraint to signal realism, competition may lead banks to be insufficiently conservative in their lending, thus reducing capital - market efficiency. High collateral requirements decrease efficiency further. We discuss bank regulation and bankruptcy rules in connection with the problems that optimistic entrepreneurs present. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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