Detail Rationing in A Durable Goods Monopoly   Oleh:  Denicolo', Vincenzo ; Garella, Paolo Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 30 no. 1 (1999), page 44-55. Topik: monopoly; rationing; durable goods; monopoly Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We offer a new explanation of equilibrium rationing. As is well known, a monopolist selling a durable good and not able to commit to a price sequence has an incentive to lower the price once the consumers with the greatest willingness to pay have bought, but this induces consumers to postpone purchases. We show that rationing reduces the incentive to lower future prices and may allow the monopolist to increase his discounted profit. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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