Detail Interfering With Secondary Markets   Oleh:  Hendel, Igal ; Lizzeri, Alessandro Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 30 no. 1 (1999), page 1-21. Topik: MARKETS; interfering; secondary markets Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We present a model to address in a unified manner four ways in which a monopolist can interfere with secondary markets. In the model, consumers have heterogeneous valuations for quality so that used - good markets play an allocative role. Our results are the following : (1) In contrast to Swan's famous independence result, a monopolist does not provide socially optimal durability. (2) Allowing the monopolist to rent does not restore socially optimal durability and increases the monopolist's market power in the used market. However, forcing the monopolist to sell the goods may be a bad policy because it would lead to either lower output or lower durability. (3) The manufacturer benefits from a well functioning used - good market despite the fact that used goods provide competition for new goods. (4) The monopolist prefers to restrict consumers' abilities to maintain the good. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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