Detail An Empirical Examination of Moral Hazard in The Vehicle Inspection Market   Oleh:  Hubbard, Thomas N. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 29 no. 2 (1998), page 406-426. Topik: MORAL HAZARD; empirical examination; moral hazard; vehicle inspection market Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Moral hazard arises in "diagnosis - cure" markets such as auto repair and health care when sellers have an incentive to misrepresent a buyer's condition in order to increase demand for the treatments they supply. This article examines the market for California vehicle emission inspections. Using transaction - level data, I investigate whether the market provides incentives that lead inspectors to help vehicles pass and how the behaviour of inspectors varies with their firm's organizational characteristics. I find that consumers are generally able to provide firms and inspectors incentives to help them pass, and I find cross-firm differences that are consistent with agency theory. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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