Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly : All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment  

Oleh:

Corts, Kenneth S.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 29 no. 2 (1998), page 306-323.
Topik: commitment; price discrimination; oligopoly; competition; strategic commitment

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition, leading to lower prices for all consumers ; the tradeoff of consumer groups' welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise. This escalation of competition may make firms worse off, and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate - including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no - haggle policies - may raise firm profits by softening price competition.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali