Detail Pricing Regulation Under Bypass Competition   Oleh:  Rey, Patrick ; Jullein, Bruno ; Curien, Nicolas Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 29 no. 2 (1998), page 259-279. Topik: REGULATION; pricing regulation; bypass competition Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We analyze optimal pricing policies in local telecommunications subject to bypass for the access of long - distance carriers. We first consider the case of a regulated monopoly that operates the local network and has access to an additional technology (bypass) more efficient for large customers. We then study how competition in bypass affects the optimal nonlinear pricing policy and the resulting allocation. When transfers are allowed between the regulator and the network operator, bypass competition benefits consumers at the expense of the taxpayer, otherwise it benefits large consumers but hurts small ones. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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