Detail Auction From Preferences of Risk-Averse Bid Takers   Oleh:  Rothkopf. Michael H. ; Harstad, Ronald M. ; Waehrer, Keith Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 29 no. 1 (1998), page 179-192. Topik: auction; auction; risk - averse; bid takers Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We analyze the preferences of a risk - averse seller over the class of "standard" auctions with symmetric and risk-neutral bidders. Assuming that buyers' private signals are independently distributed, we find that a sealed - bid first - price auction with an appropriately set reserve price is preferred by all risk - averse sellers to any other standard auction. In first- and second - price auctions, the more risk averse a seller, the lower the seller's optimal reserve price. Given two first - price auctions with reserve prices and entry fees such that both have the same screening level, all risk - averse sellers prefer the auction with the lower entry fee. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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