Detail Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contribution to Public Goods   Oleh:  Siew, Hong Teoh Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 3 (1997), page 385-406. Topik: disclosure; information disclosure; voluntary contributions; public goods Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This article analyzes the effect of information generation and disclosure upon free - riding and on the likelihood that coopeartive efforts collaps in a public - goods game. On this model, the prospect of greater disclosure can make all individuals worse of ex ante by reducing expected contribnutions to the public good. The model provides conditions under which disclosure becomes either more or less desirable as a function of the number of individual contributors. Regulation or competitive problems that increase direct costs of disclosure may on average increase the provision of public goods and improve welfare. The desirability of disclosure in the contexts of colective political action, debt renegotiation, and production in teams are discussed. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

Copyright © 2006, 2007 Unika Atma Jaya, all rights reserved