Detail Common Agency With Horizontally Differentiated Principals   Oleh:  Mezzetti, Claudio Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 2 (1997), page 323-345. Topik: agency; common agency; differentiated principals Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel I analyze a common agency relationship where the agent has private information about the difference in his value for two principals. When the principals independently offer incentive contracts, the agent specializes less than is socially efficient, but more than when they cooperate and choose the contract that maximizes their joint payoff. Under both arrangements the agent faces countervailing incentives. The pooling region of types receiving a flat fee is larger and the incentive pay of the remaining types is lower powered under cooperatin than under independent contracting. The principals prefer independent contracting with a common agent to exclusive dealing. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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