Information Control, Career Concerns, And Corporate Governance  

Oleh:

Thakor, Anjan V. ; Song, Fenghua

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 61 no. 4 (Agu. 2006), page 1845-1896.
Topik: INFORMATION; boards of directors; corporate governance; studies economic conditions; impact analysis; careers; chief executive officers; information dissemination
Fulltext: p 1845.pdf (479.1KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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We examine corporate governance effectiveness when the CEO generates project ideas and the board of directors screens these ideas for aproval. However, the prevision of board's screening information is controlled by the CEO. Moreover both the CEO and the board have career concerns that interact. The board's career concerns cause it to distort its investment recommendation procyclically, whereas the CEO's career concerns cause her to sometimes reduce the precision of the board's information. Moreover the CEO sometimes prefers a less able board, and this happens only during economic upturns, suggesting that corporate governance will be weaker during economic upturns.

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