Detail The Value of Correlated Signals in Agencies   Oleh:  Sarath, Bharat ; Rajan, Madhav V. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 1 (1997), page 150-167. Topik: agencies; value; signals; agencies Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We analyze optimal correlation levels in information technologies when multiple signals are available as contracting mechanisms within the principal - agent paradigm. We identify sufficient conditions ensuring that uniformly lower - correlation functions in action levels are preferred, as well as (mutually disjoint) sufficient conditions for a higher - correlation function to be preferred. We also show that if correlation levels and invariant in the agent's action choice, the preference is for negative correlation, but not perfectly negative correlation. We generalize techniques originally used for probing blackwell's theorem and show that our results extend to the decision context as well. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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