Detail Technology-Traditing Coalitions in Supergames   Oleh:  Eswaran, Mukesh ; Eaton, Curtis Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 1 (1997), page 135-149. Topik: COALITION [SOCIAL SCIENCES]; technology - traditing; coalitions; supergames Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We attempt to explain the observation that rival firms often share their technologies. We show that the trading of technical information over the long haul can be sustained as an equilibrium in super games. The strategy of ejection of a cheating firm from a technology - trading coalition, followed by the continuation of technology trading by the non cheating members, better facilitates trading than does a strategy in which cheating results in the dissolution of the coalition. Technology trading is often welfare improving and firms may form small coalitions. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

Copyright © 2006, 2007 Unika Atma Jaya, all rights reserved