Detail Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts   Oleh:  Emons, Winand Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 1 (1997), page 107-119. Topik: PUBLIC GOODS; credence goods; fraudulent experts Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This article is about a market for credence goods. With a credence good, consumers are never sure about the extent of the good they actually need. Therefore, sellers act as experts determining the customers' requirements. This information asymmetry between buyers and sellers obviously creates strong incentives for sellers to cheat on services. I analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent seller behaviour. From the observation of market data such as prices, market shares, etc. Consumers can infer the sellers' incentives. I show that market equilibria resulting in fraudulent behaviour do indeed exist. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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