Detail The Design of Multidimensional Auctions   Oleh:  Branco, Fernando Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 1 (1997), page 63-81. Topik: DESIGN; multidimensional auctions Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Procurement auctions usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of the contract to be fullfilled. In this article I study the design of such mechanisms, allowing for a special case of correlation on the firm's costs. I describe the properties of optimal mechanisms and study the design of multidimensional auctions. Contrary to the independent - costs model, to implement the optimal outcome the procurer will need to use a two - stage auction, in the first stage the procurer selects on firm, in the second stage he bargains to readjust the level of quality to be provided. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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