Detail Inefficiency of The Subgame Optimal Entry Regulation   Oleh:  Kim, Jaehong Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 1 (1997), page 25-36. Topik: REGULATION; subgame optimal entry; regulation Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel The literature on excess entry shows that the free - entry equilibrium number of firms may be greater than is socially optimal, and proposes government entry regulation as not remedy. This article tries to show that such a policy recommendation is misleading. A two - period, three - person entry game model, which explicitly includes second - best government, shows that entry regulation aimed at preventing excess entry actually induces the incumbent to behave strategically against the government and makes the final outcome socially suboptimal compared to cases in which there is no government intervention. Entry regulation is subgame optimal : however, it is globally suboptimal. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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