To File or Not To File ? Systemic Incentives, Corporate Control, and The Bankruptcy Decision  

Oleh:

Donoher, William I.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: JOM: Journal of Management vol. 30 no. 2 (2004), page 239-262.
Topik: CORPORATE; systemic incentives; corporate control; bankruptcy decision
Fulltext: 239.pdf (176.06KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ92.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This research investigates the distinctions between bankrupt firms and equally leveraged firms that avoid bankruptcy. Building upon the systemic incentives of bankruptcy law, and specifically those applicable to Chapter 11 reorganizations, the study argues that the firm’s governance and capital structure characteristics moderate the relationship between the firm’s financial condition and the filing decision. The results of this study indicate that, contrary to agency theoretical predictions, firms with high levels of inside equity ownership and secured indebtedness file in poorer financial condition than peer firms with low levels of these variables. By contrast, firms with high levels of outside equity ownership and short - term indebtedness file when in relatively better financial condition.

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