Wealth And Executive Compensation  

Oleh:

Becker, Bo

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 61 no. 1 (Feb. 2006), page 379-398.
Topik: WEALTH; chief executive officers; wealth; executive compensation; studies; correlation analysis
Fulltext: p 379.pdf (146.17KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Using new data on the wealth of Swedish CEOs, I show that higher wealth CEOs receive stronger incentives. Since high wealth (excluding own-firm holdings) implies low absolute risk aversion, this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation. To examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power, I use lagged wealth (typically measured before the CEO was hired) and the results remain for one of two incentive measures. also, the wealth-incentive result are not stronger for CEOs likely to face limited owner oversight. Finally, wealth is unrelated to pay levels, and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill.

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