Transaction Costs and The Robustness of The Coase Theorem  

Oleh:

Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 116 no. 508 (2006), page 223-245.
Topik: transaction cost; transaction costs; coase theorem; robustness; inefficiencies
Fulltext: 223.pdf (226.06KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.20 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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This paper explores the extent to which ex ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify the basic 'hold - up problem' that arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay ex ante costs for the negotiation to take place. We then show that a 'Coasian solution' to this problem is not available : a Coasian solution typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation, which in turn is associated with a fresh set of ex ante costs, and hence a new hold - up problem.

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