Belief, modality, opacity, and the referential/attributive distinction  

Oleh:

Wreen, Michael

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Linguistics: An Interdisciplinary Journal of The Language Sciences vol. 22 no. 3 (1984), page 313-340.

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan PKBB Nomor Panggil: 405/LING/22 Non-tandon: tidak ada Tandon: 1

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Isi artikel

This paper is a critical analysis of an approach to problems of referential opacity taken, or at least entertained, by many logicians. It is also an explication and defense of an important distinction. In section I, I sketch the so-called modal and belief paradoxes and expose the logician's approach, as I'll call it, to those paradoxes. In sections II and III, I criticize the logician's approach and argue that modal and belief contexts are not parallel as far as referential opacity is concerned, and that there is a way of resolving the modal paradox without invoking the theory of descriptions, a way overlooked by Quine, Smullyan, and other logicians. Sections IV and V contain a defense of my main argument and an explication of the referential/attributive distinction.

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