Governance Mechanisms And Equity Prices  

Oleh:

Nair, Vinay B. ; Cremers, K. J. Martijn

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 60 no. 6 (Dec. 2005), page 2859-2894.
Topik: equity; corporate governance; acquisitions & mergers; rates of return; strategic planning; studies; correlation analysis
Fulltext: p 2859.pdf (229.0KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and share - holder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of "high" vulnerability to takeovers. The complementary effect exists for firms with lower industry - adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.

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