CEO Compensation, Change, and Corporate Strategy  

Oleh:

Raposo, Clara C. ; Dow, James

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 60 no. 6 (Dec. 2005), page 2701-2728.
Topik: CEO COMPENSATION; Executive Compensation; Correlation Analysis; Strategic Management; Shareholder Relations; Chief Executive Officers; Studies
Fulltext: p 2701.pdf (163.65KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

CEO compensation can influence the kinds of strategies that firms adopt. We argue that performance-related compensation creates an incentive to look for overly ambitious, hard to implement strategies. At a cost, shareholders can curb this tendency by precommitting to a regime of CEO overcompensation in highly changeable environments. Alternatively shareholders can commit to low CEO pay, although this requires a commitment mechanism (either by the board of the individual company, or by the society as a whole) to counter the incentive to renegotiate upwards. We study the conditions under which the different policies for CEO compensation are preferred by shareholders.

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