How Subgroup Interests and Reputations Moderate The Effect of Organizational Identification on Cooperation  

Oleh:

Polzer, Jeffrey T.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: JOM: Journal of Management vol. 30 no. 1 (2004), page 71-96.
Topik: ORGANIZATIONAL; subgroup interests; reputations; organizational identification; cooperation
Fulltext: 71.pdf (176.35KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ92.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Two experiments tested the effects of organizational identification on individual decisions to cooperate. These decisions occurred in the context of a nested social dilemma in which individuals, subgroups, and the larger collective each held distinct and incompatible interests. In Study 1, when the two subgroups in the dilemma were from different real organizations, higher organizational identification caused lower cooperation with the collective (and higher cooperation with the subgroup) when the opposing organization had a purportedly individualistic culture and reputation. The results of Study 2 supported this interpretation by showing that organizational identification had a negative effect on collective cooperation, and a corresponding positive effect on subgroup cooperation, when decision makers perceived the opposing department to have an individualistic reputation. I discuss the implications of these results for organizations that try to elicit cooperation by fostering members’ organizational identification.

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