Learning to Bid - An Experimental Study of Bid Function Adjustment in Auctions and Fair Division Games  

Oleh:

Guth, Werner ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta ; Konigstein, Manfred ; Strobel, Martin

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 113 no. 487 (2003), page 477-494.
Topik: LEARNING; learning to bid; bid function; auctions; fair division games
Fulltext: 477.pdf (311.95KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.10 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We examine learning behaviour in auction and fair division experiments with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants play all four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to study how institutional changes are anticipated and whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games. We find that learning does not drive bidding towards the benchmark solution. Bid functions are adjusted globally rather than locally. Directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid changes. The data support a cognitive approach to learning.

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