Larger Shareholders and Banks : Who Monitors and How ?  

Oleh:

Yafeh, Yishay ; Yosha, Oved

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 113 no. 484 (2003), page 128-146.
Topik: shareholders; shareholders; banks; monitors
Fulltext: 128.pdf (126.21KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.9 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Using a sample of Japanese firms in the chemical industry, we show that concentrated shareholding is associated with lower expenditure on activities with scope for managerial private benefits. We interpreted as evidence of a hitherto undocumented form of monitoring by large shareholders. We examine whether such monitoring is also performed by banks and other creditors. The results in the metal product industry are roughly similar, but no evidence if found of this type of monitoring the Japanese electronics industry, and a number of explanations.

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