Informal Family Insurance and The Design of The Welfare State  

Oleh:

Tella, Rafael Di ; MacCulloch, Robert

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 112 no. 481 (2002), page 481-503.
Topik: INSURANCE; family insurance; design; welfare state
Fulltext: 481.pdf (201.62KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.8 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We study unemployment benefit provision when the family also provides social insurance. In the benchmark case, more generous State transfers crowd out family risk - sharing one - for - one. An extension gives the State an advantage in enforcing transfers through taxes (whereas families rely on self - enforcement). More generous State transfers lead to more than one - for - one reductions in intra - family insurance, so that total transfers to the unemployed fall as the State's generosity increases. This does not imply that the optimal size of the Welfare State is zero. Our results still hold when families are assumed to be better than the State at monitoring job search activities of unemployed.

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