On Culpable Ignorance and Akrasia  

Oleh:

Robichaud, Philip

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 125 no. 1 (Oct. 2014), page 137–151.
Topik: ignorance; culpable ignorance; akrasia

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

A point of contention in recent discussions of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility is whether culpable ignorance must trace to akratic belief mismanagement. Neil Levy has recently defended an akrasia requirement by arguing that only an akratic agent has the capacity rationally to comply with epistemic expectations the violation of which contributes to her ignorance. In this paper I show that Levy’s argument is unsound. It is possible to have the relevant rational capacity in the absence of akrasia. I also argue that the internalist account of rationality that does much of the work in his argument is problematic.

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