Evolution and Impartiality  

Oleh:

Kahane, Guy

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 124 no. 2 (Jan. 2014), page 327-341.
Topik: evolution; impartiality;

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer argue that evolutionary considerations can resolve Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason because such considerations debunk moral views that give weight to self-interested or partial considerations but cannot threaten the principle of universal benevolence. I argue that even if we grant these claims, this appeal to evolution is ultimately self-defeating. De Lazari-Radek and Singer face a dilemma. Either their evolutionary argument against partial morality succeeds, but then we need to also give up our conviction that suffering is bad; or there is a way to defend this conviction, but then their argument against partiality fails. Utilitarians, I suggest, should resist the temptation to appeal to evolutionary debunking arguments.

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