Union Power, Replacement and Labour Market Dynamics  

Oleh:

Padilla, A. Jorge ; Kuhn, Kai-Uwe

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 112 no. 479 (2002), page 317-343.
Topik: labour market; union power; labour market; dynamics
Fulltext: 317.pdf (424.55KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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In this paper, we construct a new basis for insider - outsider theory that acknowledges that insiders are typically easier to organise, so that they can delegate their bargaining decisions to a representative if they want to. We show that harassment or discrimination of new workers by the insider work force is neither individually rational nor needed to explain union formation or inefficient hiring decisions. However, we show that there is a strong tendency for overemployment. Unions tend to increase the efficiency of hiring decisions although union contracts will look like inducing underemployment.

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