Differential Diagnosis and the Suspension of Judgment  

Oleh:

Kennedy, Ashley Graham

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy vol. 38 no. 5 (Oct. 2013), page 461-486.
Topik: diagnosis; epistemology; ethics; evidence; physician-patient relationship; respect; virtues

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: MM80 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In this paper I argue that ethics and evidence are intricately intertwined within the clinical practice of differential diagnosis. Too often, when a disease is difficult to diagnose, a physician will dismiss it as being “not real” or “all in the patient’s head.” This is both an ethical and an evidential problem. In the paper my aim is two-fold. First, via the examination of two case studies (late-stage Lyme disease and Addison’s disease), I try to elucidate why this kind of dismissal takes place. Then, I propose a potential solution to the problem. I argue that instead of dismissing a patient’s illness as “not real,” physicians ought to exercise a compassionate suspension of judgment when a diagnosis cannot be immediately made. I argue that suspending judgment has methodological, epistemic, and ethical virtues and therefore should always be preferred to patient dismissal in the clinical setting.

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