The Infectiousness of Nihilism  

Oleh:

MacAskill, William

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 123 no. 3 (Apr. 2013), page 508-520.
Topik: Rejecting Ethical Deflationism; assume that nihilism; incomparability; moral uncertainty

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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In “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism,” Jacob Ross argues that a rational decision maker is permitted, for the purposes of practical reasoning, to assume that nihilism is false. I argue that Ross’s argument fails because the principle he relies on conflicts with more plausible principles of rationality and leads to preference cycles. I then show how the infectiousness of nihilism, and of incomparability more generally, poses a serious problem for the larger project of attempting to incorporate moral uncertainty into expected value maximization style reasoning.

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