Assuring, Threatening, a Fully Maximizing Theory of Practical Rationality, and the Practical Duties of Agents  

Oleh:

MacIntosh, Duncan

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 123 no. 4 (Jul. 2013), page 625-656.
Topik: Assuring; Threatening; a Fully Maximizing Theory of Practical Rationality; the Practical Duties of Agents

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Theories of practical rationality say when it is rational to form and fulfill intentions to do actions. David Gauthier says the correct theory would be the one our obeying would best advance the aim of rationality, something Humeans take to be the satisfaction of one’s desires. I use this test to evaluate the received theory and Gauthier’s 1984 and 1994 theories. I find problems with the theories and then offer a theory superior by Gauthier’s test and immune to the problems. On this theory, it is rational to treat something different as the aim when doing so would advance the original aim. I argue that the idea that this would be irrational bad faith entails contradictions and so is false, as must be theories saying that rationally we must always treat as the aim the bringing about of objectively good states of affairs or obeying a universalizable moral code.

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