How Reasons Bear on Intentions  

Oleh:

Hubbs, Graham

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 124 no. 1 (Oct. 2013), page 84-100.

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This article is a critical response to Mark Schroeder’s recent “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.” In this essay, Schroeder claims that it is possible for a right-kind reason to bear on an intention without that reason bearing on the object of the intention. I examine Schroeder’s central argument for this claim and conclude that it does not deliver the result Schroeder desires. My critique turns on explicating and extending some of G. E. M. Anscombe’s remarks in Intention on the structure of practical reasoning.

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