Bidding and Information : Evidence From Gilt-Edge Auctions  

Oleh:

Breedon, Francis ; Ganley, Joe

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 110 no. 466 (2000), page 963-984.
Topik: BIDDING; bidding; information; gilt- edge; auctions
Fulltext: 963.pdf (510.35KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Many studies have shown that government debt auctions underprice debt compared with the secondary market. This paper corroborates this for certain forms of gilt auction by comparing the price received at auction with an almost identical parent stock in the secondary market. Although the sample is small, the parent / auction stock price comparison gives a cleaner measure than used in other studies. The paper also compares non - fungible auctions (where the auction stock differs slightly from the parent at auction and merges subsequently) with fully - fungible ones (where they are identical throughout). Significant underpricing only occurs in non - fungible auctions.

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