Comment on Dawid, Faigman, and Fienberg (2014)  

Oleh:

Cheng, Edward K.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Sociological Methods & Research (SMR) vol. 43 no. 03 (Aug. 2014), page 396-400.
Topik: Burden of Proof; Reference Classes; Narratives

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan PKPM Nomor Panggil: S28 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Out of the morass that characterizes the law’s handling of statistical evidence, Dawid, Faigman, and Fienberg (DFF) have articulated an important distinction between the effects of causes and the causes of effects. Rather than blaming the legal system’s confusion over statistical evidence on ignorance or ideology, they more helpfully suggest that the culprit may be a failure to understand the context in which statistical studies typically arise. At its core, DFF’s contribution is a valuable call for precision. “Statistical evidence of causation” is not a wholesale category. And just as we would not conflate factual with proximate causation in tort law, or causation with correlation in statistics, neither should we conflate the effects of causes with the causes of effects. In addition to the applications offered in the article, DFF’s cause–effect distinction implicates, or at least evokes, several other discussions in the law of evidence. I hope to highlight three of these links in the brief remarks that follow.

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